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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Wayne Land and Mineral Group, LLC, a company that 
wants to obtain natural gas by fracking reserves in 
Pennsylvania,1 appeals from the dismissal of its complaint for 
                                              
1  “Fracking,” or hydraulic fracturing, is the process by 
which a mixture of water and various chemicals is injected into 
the ground at high pressure to cause the release of natural gas 
trapped in shale rock formations.  See Fracking, Merriam-
Webster.com (last updated Mar. 29, 2018); see also Hydraulic 
Fracturing, McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and 
Technical Terms (6th ed. 2003).   
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failure to state a claim.  Wayne sought a ruling in the District 
Court under the Declaratory Judgment Act that an interstate 
compact does not give the Delaware River Basin Commission 
authority to review Wayne’s proposed fracking activities.  The 
Commission argued in response that Wayne’s claim was 
properly dismissed as unripe, that Wayne lacks standing, that 
there has been no final agency action, and that Wayne has not 
exhausted available administrative remedies.  The District 
Court rejected those arguments but nevertheless denied 
Wayne’s request for relief and dismissed the case under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), after determining 
that Wayne’s proposed activities constituted a “project” 
subject to the Commission’s oversight, according to the 
unambiguous terms of the interstate compact.  Because we 
conclude that the meaning of the word “project” as used in the 
compact is ambiguous, we will vacate the order of dismissal 
and remand the case for fact-finding on the intent of the 
compact’s drafters. 
I. BACKGROUND FACTS2 
 
                                              
 
2  The background facts are drawn from the parties’ 
jointly-submitted appendices, Wayne’s complaint, and any 
documents necessarily relied upon in that complaint.  
Additionally, some of the facts were derived from the District 
Court’s evidentiary hearing.  The jointly-submitted appendices 
include the interstate compact, which we cite extensively.  
Otherwise the joint appendices are only relied upon here to 
provide context. 
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A. The Delaware River Basin, the Interstate 
Compact, and the Delaware River Basin 
Commission 
The Delaware River Basin (the “Basin”) is an area of 
land surrounding and draining into the Delaware River that 
extends through parts of Delaware, New Jersey, New York, 
and Pennsylvania (the “Basin States”).  In 1961, the Basin 
States and the United States entered into the Delaware River 
Basin Compact (the “Compact”), which is an interstate 
agreement aimed at ensuring a unified approach to the 
conservation, utilization, development, management, and 
control of the water and related resources of the Basin.   
 
The Compact created the Delaware River Basin 
Commission, comprising the Governors of the Basin States, as 
well as a commissioner appointed by the President of the 
United States.  By its terms, it gives the Commission a broad 
range of powers to protect water quantity and quality within 
the Basin.  Most relevant to this case are the Commission’s 
general powers and duties, which are detailed in Article 3 of 
the Compact.  Article 3 charges the Commission with creating 
“[a] comprehensive plan … for the immediate and long range 
development and uses of the water resources of the [B]asin[.]”  
(Joint App. at 366, § 3.2(a).)  That plan must “include all public 
and private projects and facilities which are required, in the 
judgment of the [C]ommission, for the optimum planning, 
development, conservation, utilization, management and 
control of the water resources of the [B]asin to meet present 
and future needs[.]”  (Joint App. at 386, § 13.1.) 
 
Consistent with that planning responsibility, Article 3 
gives the Commission the authority to review “projects” 
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undertaken in the Basin if they will have “a substantial effect 
on the water resources of the [B]asin[.]”  (Joint App. at 370, 
§ 3.8.)  The Commission has the power to promulgate rules 
“for the procedure of submission, review and consideration of 
projects[.]”  (Joint App. at 370, § 3.8.)  More fully, the 
Compact states the criteria for that review process as follows: 
 
No project having a substantial effect on the 
water resources of the [B]asin shall hereafter be 
undertaken by any person, corporation or 
governmental authority unless it shall have been 
first submitted to and approved by the 
[C]ommission, subject to the provisions of 
Sections 3.3 and 3.5.  The [C]ommission shall 
approve a project whenever it finds and 
determines that such project would not 
substantially impair or conflict with the 
comprehensive plan and may modify and 
approve as modified, or may disapprove any 
such project whenever it finds and determines 
that the project would substantially impair or 
conflict with such plan. 
 
(Joint App. at 370, § 3.8.) 
 
The Compact defines many of its key terms, including 
the word “project,” which is said to be 
 
any work, service or activity which is separately 
planned, financed, or identified by the 
[C]ommission, or any separate facility 
undertaken or to be undertaken within a specified 
area, for the conservation, utilization, control, 
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development or management of water resources 
which can be established and utilized 
independently or as an addition to an existing 
facility, and can be considered as a separate 
entity for purposes of evaluation[.] 
 
(Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(g).)  The Compact then defines “water 
resources” to include: 
 
water and related natural resources in, on, under, 
or above the ground, including related uses of 
land, which are subject to beneficial use, 
ownership or control. 
 
(Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(i).)  Finally, in sweeping language, 
the Compact defines “facility” as: 
 
any real or personal property, within or without 
the [B]asin, and improvements thereof or 
thereon, and any and all rights of way, water, 
water rights, plants, structures, machinery and 
equipment, acquired, constructed, operated or 
maintained for the beneficial use of water 
resources or related land uses including, without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, any and 
all things and appurtenances necessary, useful or 
convenient for the control, collection, storage, 
withdrawal, diversion, release, treatment, 
transmission, sale or exchange of water; or for 
navigation thereon, or the development and use 
of hydroelectric energy and power, and public 
recreational facilities; or the propagation of fish 
and wildlife; or to conserve and protect the water 
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resources of the [B]asin or any existing or future 
water supply source, or to facilitate any other 
uses of any of them[.] 
 
(Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(e).) 
 
 The Compact also gives the Commission power to 
address pollution within the Basin.  Under Article 5 of the 
Compact, “[t]he [C]ommission may undertake investigations 
and surveys, and acquire, construct, operate and maintain 
projects and facilities to control potential pollution and abate 
or dilute existing pollution of the water resources of the 
[B]asin.”  (Joint App. at 372, § 5.1.)  Article 5 provides the 
following: 
 
The [C]ommission may assume jurisdiction to 
control future pollution and abate existing 
pollution in the waters of the [B]asin, whenever 
it determines after investigation and public 
hearing upon due notice that the effectuation of 
the comprehensive plan so requires.  The 
standard of such control shall be that pollution by 
sewage or industrial or other waste originating 
within a signatory state shall not injuriously 
affect waters of the [B]asin as contemplated by 
the comprehensive plan.  The [C]ommission, 
after such public hearing may classify the waters 
of the [B]asin and establish standards of 
treatment of sewage, industrial or other waste, 
according to such classes including allowance 
for the variable factors of surface and ground 
waters, such as size of the stream, flow, 
movement, location, character, self-purification, 
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and usage of the waters affected.  After such 
investigation, notice and hearing the 
[C]ommission may adopt and from time to time 
amend and repeal rules, regulations and 
standards to control such future pollution and 
abate existing pollution, and to require such 
treatment of sewage, industrial or other waste 
within a time reasonable for the construction of 
the necessary works, as may be required to 
protect the public health or to preserve the waters 
of the [B]asin for uses in accordance with the 
comprehensive plan. 
 
(Joint App. at 372, § 5.2.) 
 
 It is plain that the Commission has broad rulemaking 
and enforcement powers.  Under Article 14 of the Compact, 
the Commission may “[m]ake and enforce reasonable rules and 
regulations for the effectuation, application and enforcement 
of this [C]ompact[.]”  (Joint App. at 389, § 14.2(a).) 
 
B. Natural Gas Fracking and the Moratorium 
Natural gas reserves underlie at least some of the land 
within the Basin.  To extract natural gas from shale rock 
formations, energy companies use a combination of horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing.  From an area on the ground 
called a well pad, companies employ fracking technology to 
inject a fluid composed of water and various chemicals into the 
ground to force the release of trapped gas.  It is estimated that 
the fracking process may require up to five million gallons of 
water per well.  Some of the water in the fracking fluid is 
consumed and will remain underground, while the rest will 
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flow back to the surface where it is recovered and either 
disposed of or recycled.   
 
The extraction and sale of natural gas may be profitable 
for those involved, and it certainly provides benefits to energy 
consumers, but fracking is not without controversy – in 
particular, concerns that it may adversely affect the quality and 
quantity of water resources.  As a result, the Commission has 
asserted authority over fracking-related activities in the Basin.   
 
In 2009, the then-Executive Director of the 
Commission, Carol Collier, issued a moratorium banning most 
natural gas fracking projects located “within the drainage area 
of Special Protection Waters,” unless there was prior 
Commission approval.3  (Joint App. at 98.)  Collier began by 
explaining that fracking had grown in the Basin due to 
technological advances, and that those natural gas projects 
involved a number of activities that, “if not properly 
performed[,] may cause adverse environmental effects, 
including effects on water resources.”4  (Joint App. at 97.) 
                                              
3 The “Special Protection Waters,” which are subject to 
a regulatory program created by the Commission, are defined 
as the non-tidal part of the Basin, which is all of the Basin north 
of Trenton, New Jersey. 
 
4 Some of the activities cited include: 
construction of a well pad and associated 
roadways …, the drilling of a well bore …, the 
withdrawal and transport of surface or ground 
water, the injection of the water and chemical 
fracturing mixtures into the wells to release the 
11 
 
 
 The initial 2009 moratorium covered projects that 
included a “drilling pad upon which a well intended for 
eventual production is located, all appurtenant facilities and 
activities related thereto and all locations of water withdrawals 
used or to be used to supply water to the project.”  (Joint App. 
at 98.)  But, at that time, “[w]ells intended solely for 
exploratory purposes” were not covered by the moratorium.  
(Joint App. at 98.) 
 
 Collier expanded that moratorium in 2010 in a 
supplemental notice letter.  She withdrew the exclusion for 
exploratory wells and stated that “all natural gas well project 
sponsors, including the sponsors of natural gas well projects 
intended solely for exploratory purposes, … may not 
commence any natural gas well project for the production from 
or exploration of shale formations within the drainage area of 
Special Protection Waters without first” obtaining the approval 
of the Commission.  (Joint App. at 113 (emphasis omitted).)  
Collier said that the inclusion of exploratory wells in the 
moratorium would “support the Commission’s goal that 
exploratory wells do not serve as a source of degradation of the 
Commission’s Special Protection Waters,” by “remov[ing] any 
regulatory incentive” to engage in purportedly “exploratory” 
                                              
trapped gas, the recovery and storage of 
recovered fracturing fluid, water and associated 
leached constituents extracted with the gas, the 
storage and potentially the reuse of the recovered 
wastewater and chemicals and the eventual 
disposal of the water and chemicals. 
 
(Joint App. at 97.) 
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drilling before the Commission could implement final natural 
gas regulations.  (Joint App. at 113.) 
 
Since then, the Commission has not issued any final 
regulations with respect to the procedures and rules governing 
the review of fracking projects.5   
                                              
5  The Commission released proposed fracking 
regulations at the end of 2010, received about 69,000 
comments on those proposed regulations, and released revised 
draft regulations in 2011.  But the Commission never made a 
final decision with respect to those draft regulations.  The 
Commission adopted a resolution in September 2017 
instructing its Executive Director to publish new proposed 
natural gas fracking regulations by November 30, 2017, which 
were published on that final day.  See Proposed New 18 C.F.R. 
Part 440, Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale and Other Formations, 
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/HydraulicFract
uring/18CFR440_HydraulicFracturing_draft-for-
comment_113017.pdf.  The public comment period closed on 
March 30, 2018, and if the final regulations track the proposed 
regulations without change, “[h]igh volume hydraulic 
fracturing in hydrocarbon bearing rock formations [will be] 
prohibited within the Delaware River Basin.”  Administrative 
Manual and Special Regulations Regarding Natural Gas 
Development Activities; Additional Clarifying Amendments, 
83 Fed. Reg. 1586, 1595 (proposed Jan. 12, 2018) (to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 440). 
Nevertheless, the parties in this case agree that those 
proposed regulations do not prevent us from deciding Wayne’s 
claim.  Wayne contends that, unless the Commission is 
prepared to no longer assert project review authority over 
fracking projects within the Basin under § 3.8 of the Compact, 
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C. Wayne 
Wayne Land and Mineral Group, LLC is a Pennsylvania 
company that alleges it has been particularly harmed by the 
Commission’s moratorium on fracking.  It owns about 180 
acres of land in Wayne County, Pennsylvania, and roughly 75 
acres of that land are located within the Basin.  That is the 
portion of Wayne’s property that contains shale formations 
with natural gas reserves.  Wayne wants to build a natural gas 
well pad and related infrastructure on its property, drill an 
exploratory well targeting the recoverable natural gas in the 
shale, and if viable, drill a horizontal well and use fracking to 
extract gas for sale.  Wayne contends that the Commission’s 
moratorium is wrongly impeding its investment-backed 
expectations.   
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
                                              
the proposed regulations have “no bearing on [Wayne’s] 
narrowly-tailored claim.”  (Wayne’s Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) 
Letter, dated Oct. 18, 2017, at 4.)  The Commission contends 
that the proposed regulations have “no direct effect on the 
issues raised in this appeal” because the Commission has “not 
purport[ed] to make a final decision on any issues” and its 
“authority to issue regulations under the Compact is not 
dependent on its Section 3.8 (project review) authority[.]”  
(Commission’s Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) Letter, dated Oct. 18, 
2017, at 2.)  The Delaware Riverkeeper Network also stated 
that the Commission’s “initiation of rulemaking does not affect 
the issues presented in this appeal.”  (Delaware Riverkeeper 
Network’s Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) Letter, dated Oct. 18, 2017, at 
2.) 
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A. The Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss, and the 
Motions for Intervention 
Wayne filed suit against the Commission in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  
In its complaint, it said that the Commission lacks the authority 
under the Compact “to review and approve a natural gas well 
pad, a gas well and related facilities and associated activities 
on [Wayne’s] property” within the Basin.  (Joint App. at 62.)  
More particularly, Wayne alleged that the Commission 
overstepped its bounds by interpreting its power to review 
“projects” to include essentially “any activity, development or 
other human undertaking in the Basin that uses water[.]”  (Joint 
App. at 63-64.)  Wayne sought a declaratory judgment from 
the District Court that the Commission’s jurisdiction extends 
only to matters fitting the Compact’s definition of “project” 
and that the activities proposed by Wayne do “not constitute a 
‘project’ under Section 3.8 of the Compact.”  (Joint App. at 77-
78.)  By Wayne’s reckoning, then, whether its activities “may 
have a substantial effect on water resources in the Basin” is 
irrelevant because those activities are not a “project” subject to 
the Commission’s authority.  (Joint App. at 77.) 
 
The Commission responded by filing a motion to 
dismiss Wayne’s complaint.  It asserted that the District Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) because 
Wayne’s claim was not ripe and Wayne lacked standing.  It 
also said, in the alternative, that the District Court should 
dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted because there was no 
final agency action and Wayne did not exhaust available 
administrative remedies.  The Commission did not, however, 
make arguments countering Wayne’s reading of the Compact’s 
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text, including Wayne’s assertion about the scope of the term 
“project.”   
 
The Delaware Riverkeeper Network and an individual 
named Maya K. van Rossum, who identifies herself as “the 
Delaware Riverkeeper,” were granted permission by the 
District Court to intervene as defendants.  The Court denied 
motions to intervene from Pennsylvania State Senators Joseph 
B. Scarnati, Lisa Baker, and Gene Yaw, as well as from 
Damascus Citizens for Sustainability, Inc.  The Delaware 
Riverkeeper Network and Ms. van Rossum submitted a brief 
in support of the Commission’s motion to dismiss Wayne’s 
complaint, focusing largely on the terms of the Compact and 
the Commission’s authority to review fracking activities as 
“projects” under that Compact.   
 
B. The District Court’s Hearing 
At Wayne’s request, the District Court held an 
evidentiary hearing and heard oral argument on the 
Commission’s motion to dismiss.  The new Executive Director 
of the Commission, Steven Tambini, appeared and testified 
that the Commission had not yet adopted final rules regarding 
fracking activities in the Basin but that the Commission would 
be willing to make “a jurisdictional determination … with 
respect to natural gas activity” if one were sought.  (Joint App. 
at 180.)  Tambini confirmed that, because the Commission had 
not made a jurisdictional statement, there was no “final 
decision” as to whether Wayne’s “activities may have a 
substantial effect on the water resources of the [B]asin[.]”  
(Joint App. at 181.)  Until it made such a statement, Tambini 
claimed, the Commission could not be said to have made any 
“final determination” about whether it has “authority over 
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natural gas exploration and … production activities at a well 
pad site” under § 3.8 of the Compact.  (Joint App. at 180-81.)  
According to Tambini, such a jurisdictional determination 
would typically include an assessment of whether the 
applicant’s activities are a project and, if so, whether that 
project will have a substantial effect on the water resources in 
the Basin.  He further testified that Wayne had not filed a 
request for a jurisdictional determination, and that Wayne had 
“not asked to come in to visit with us, did not ask professionals 
to visit with us, [and] did not ask the commissioners” whether 
it had to submit its proposed fracking plans to the Commission 
for project review.  (Joint App. at 155.)  But Tambini also 
admitted that no one has ever sought a jurisdictional 
determination from the Commission regarding natural gas 
extraction.   
 
Tambini’s testimony made plain the legal risks the 
Commission can impose on energy companies.  He said that a 
company could be fined “not less than $90,000” if it failed to 
submit an application to the Commission before drilling a 
natural gas fracking well.  (Joint App. at 212, 215-16.)  And he 
agreed that, “if you were going to drill a well, construct a well 
pad, you had to file with the [C]ommission.”  (Joint App. at 
216.)  That was his understanding of the intent behind the 2009 
and 2010 moratoriums.   
 
His testimony also showed that the process for 
obtaining a jurisdictional determination, or even discovering 
the existence of that option, was hardly transparent.  He said: 
 
If you went to the website, I will be the first to 
admit there’s no application for jurisdictional 
determination.  But if you[’d] like to have a 
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meeting, have a conference, write a letter, write 
me an e-mail, whatever you want to do to get this 
started on jurisdictional determination, the 
[C]ommission has indicated that we will make a 
jurisdictional determination. 
 
(Joint App. at 227.)  Tambini stated that if the Commission has 
“information on the activities, the full scope of the [proposed 
drilling] activities, then the commissioners can make a 
jurisdictional determination.”  (Joint App. at 228.)  He 
indicated that, at a minimum, an applicant must show “where 
the water is coming from, how much water is being used, how 
many wells, how many wells by when[,] … how much [water] 
will stay in the formation, how much will be returned, when it 
does return, what is the water quality, how is it being stored, 
potentially how it’s being treated, [and] where it’s discharged,” 
among other things.  (Joint App. at 228.) 
 
C. The Dismissal of the Complaint 
The District Court denied the Commission’s motion to 
dismiss Wayne’s complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Specifically, it determined that Wayne had 
standing because it adequately alleged that the Commission’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over fracking activities within the 
Basin had caused it economic injury.  Furthermore, the Court 
concluded that Wayne’s claim was ripe because it sought a 
declaratory judgment and, in the absence of relief, Wayne 
faced a serious threat of fines for noncompliance.   
 
The District Court also rejected the Commission’s 
arguments in support of its motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim.  The Court was unpersuaded that the supposed lack of 
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final agency action was a problem, given that Wayne was 
seeking a declaratory judgment rather than judicial review of 
any specific action by the Commission.  As for the 
Commission’s argument that Wayne failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies, the District Court noted that 
declaratory judgments are available even when a plaintiff has 
other remedies.  Nevertheless, the Court decided sua sponte to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim because, on 
the merits, the Court determined the Compact’s definition of 
“project” plainly and unambiguously included Wayne’s 
proposed fracking activities.   
 
The Court gave two primary reasons for that conclusion.  
First, it stated that Wayne’s complaint alleged that Wayne 
would use water to carry out natural gas drilling activities on 
its property located within the Basin.  Second, the Court said 
that reading the definition of “project” in light of the 
Compact’s definition of “water resources” conclusively 
resolved the matter because the definition of “water resources” 
includes any “related uses of land,” which the Court believed 
clearly encompassed Wayne’s proposed fracking activities.   
 
D. Appeal 
Wayne timely appealed, and the parties have thoroughly 
briefed their positions.6  Reflecting the substantial public 
                                              
6  The Commission, the Delaware Riverkeeper 
Network, and Ms. van Rossum are the respondents, and they 
assert that we should affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
Although Wayne contends that the Delaware Riverkeeper 
Network and the Delaware Riverkeeper cannot participate in 
this appeal, courts have held that “[w]hen a party intervenes, it 
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interest in this case, amicus briefs have been submitted by four 
Pennsylvania senators and thirty Pennsylvania representatives, 
as well as by Damascus Citizens for Sustainability, Inc.  The 
state senators and representatives argue that the District 
Court’s determination that the word “project” in the Compact 
encompasses fracking-related activities permits the 
Commission to usurp the legislative authority that the 
Pennsylvania Constitution vests exclusively in the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly.7  Damascus Citizens for 
Sustainability, Inc. argues in its brief that the Commission’s 
jurisdiction over fracking and the moratorium it placed on 
fracking are the only things preventing the negative effects 
allegedly associated with fracking activity.8   
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Wayne argues that we must vacate the order dismissing 
its complaint because the District Court improperly ruled sua 
sponte on the merits, without providing Wayne notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, and because the Compact’s text 
unambiguously does not cover fracking-related activities.   The 
Commission, the Delaware Riverkeeper Network, and Ms. van 
                                              
becomes a full participant in the lawsuit and is treated just as if 
it were an original party.”  Schneider v. Dumbarton 
Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 
7  We denied a request from the Pennsylvania senators 
and representatives to intervene as appellants, but we granted 
their request to participate in oral argument.   
 
8  We are grateful for the additional insights and 
concerns expressed by the amici. 
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Rossum collectively counter that we should affirm the order of 
dismissal either because we lack jurisdiction to hear Wayne’s 
claim, because Wayne has not stated a claim to relief, or 
because we should agree with the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Compact’s text as covering Wayne’s 
proposed activities.  Because we conclude that the District 
Court rightly decided it had jurisdiction but wrongly decided 
that the Compact’s text unambiguously covers Wayne’s 
proposed activities, we will vacate the order dismissing 
Wayne’s complaint and remand the case for additional fact-
finding on the intent of the Compact’s drafters. 
 
A. Jurisdiction, Finality, and Exhaustion 
 Wayne cites 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the terms of the 
Compact as the basis of the District Court’s jurisdiction, and 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 as our jurisdictional basis.  The Commission, 
however, contends that we do not have jurisdiction to entertain 
Wayne’s claim because it is not ripe and Wayne lacks standing.  
The District Court rejected those same arguments and asserted 
jurisdiction over the case.9  “We review de novo the District 
                                              
9  The Commission did not file a cross-appeal, but “[w]e 
have previously said that an appellee may, without taking a 
cross-appeal, support the judgment as entered through any 
matter appearing in the record[.]”  In re Christopher Columbus, 
LLC, 872 F.3d 130, 133 n.5 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Additionally, subject matter 
jurisdiction may be contested at any time.  Henderson ex rel. 
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011).  Moreover, 
federal courts have an independent obligation to assure 
themselves of their own jurisdiction.  In re Klaas, 858 F.3d 
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Court’s determination of jurisdiction[.]”  Marathon Petroleum 
Corp. v. Sec’y of Fin. for Del., 876 F.3d 481, 488 n.9 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
 
1. Ripeness 
 
Our jurisdiction extends only to claims that are ripe for 
resolution.  Peachlum v. City of York, 333 F.3d 429, 433 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  The Commission argues that Wayne’s claim is not 
ripe because Wayne has not requested a jurisdictional 
determination from the Commission and there is thus no 
legally cognizable harm.  In the Commission’s view, Wayne 
has chosen not to proceed with its fracking project, instead of 
asking the Commission whether that project requires 
Commission approval.  Wayne counters that the burden of 
obtaining a jurisdictional determination is itself a harm that 
Wayne can contest by seeking declaratory relief.   
 
“The function of the ripeness doctrine is to determine 
whether a party has brought an action prematurely, and 
counsels abstention until such time as a dispute is sufficiently 
concrete to satisfy the constitutional and prudential 
requirements of the doctrine.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The 
Supreme Court has stated that a claim is ripe for review if it is 
fit for judicial decision and withholding court consideration of 
the issue would constitute a hardship to the parties.  Id. at 434 
(citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), 
abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 
99, 105 (1977)). 
 
                                              
820, 825 (3d Cir. 2017).  Thus, we can and must address the 
Commission’s jurisdictional arguments. 
22 
 
“The contours of the ripeness doctrine are particularly 
difficult to define with precision when a party seeks a 
declaratory judgment.”  Marathon Petroleum Corp., 876 F.3d 
at 496 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation 
omitted).  Yet we have stated that we are guided by three main 
considerations: the adversity of the parties’ interests, the 
conclusiveness of the judgment, and the practical utility of that 
judgment.  Id.  Applying those factors here, we agree with the 
District Court that Wayne’s claim is ripe. 
 
First, there is an adversity of legal interests.  Adversity 
is assessed by asking “[w]hether the claim involves uncertain 
and contingent events, or presents a real and substantial threat 
of harm.”  Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520, 527 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted).  “It is not necessary for the party seeking 
review to have suffered a completed harm in order to establish 
adversity of interest so long as there is a substantial threat of 
real harm that remains throughout the course of the litigation.”  
Id.  Here, Wayne faces a real and substantial threat of harm.  If 
Wayne must seek a jurisdictional determination or submit 
materials for project review – a process that, as Tambini 
testified, at a minimum requires showing “where the water is 
coming from, how much water is being used, how many wells, 
how many wells by when[,] … how much [water] will stay in 
the formation, how much will be returned, when it does return, 
what is the water quality, how is it being stored, potentially 
how it’s being treated, [and] where it’s discharged,” among 
other things, (Joint App. at 228) – it will necessarily incur 
significant expenses and legal risk in attempting to meet that 
burden.  But if Wayne forgoes submitting anything to the 
Commission, it may well face substantial fines.  The 
Commission previously fined another company $90,000 for 
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commencing natural gas drilling activities in the Basin without 
the Commission’s prior review and approval.   
 
Second, Wayne’s claim presents sufficiently concrete 
facts to allow for a conclusive legal judgment.  A claim is fit 
for adjudication if a “declaratory judgment would in fact 
determine the parties’ rights, as distinguished from an advisory 
opinion based on a hypothetical set of facts.”  Surrick, 449 F.3d 
at 528.  “Cases presenting predominately legal questions are 
particularly amenable to a conclusive determination in a 
preenforcement context, and generally require less factual 
development.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Here, Wayne’s complaint presents an important 
legal question, which is whether constructing a well pad, 
drilling an exploratory well, and commencing fracking 
constitutes a “project” subject to the Commission’s project 
review authority under the Compact.  Wayne’s claim turns on 
the proper interpretation of the Compact’s terms.  There does 
need to be some factual development in this case, as we explain 
in more detail herein, but granting or denying Wayne’s 
requested declaratory relief will conclusively determine 
whether Wayne can forego the expense of applying to the 
Commission, either for a jurisdictional determination or for 
approval of its project. 
 
The Commission cites an opinion by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for the 
contention that a declaratory judgment here would not be 
conclusive but instead would lead to piecemeal litigation.  In 
Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, the plaintiff challenged an investigating agency’s 
tentative assertion that automatic sprinkler heads manufactured 
by the plaintiff were “consumer products” within the meaning 
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of a federal statute and thus subject to the agency’s regulatory 
jurisdiction.  324 F.3d 726, 729-30 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  The 
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to that effect.  Id. at 
730.  It argued that its declaratory judgment claim was 
sufficiently ripe for decision because it was challenging “the 
agency’s statutory authority to regulate, rather than … the 
substance” of the agency’s letter determination.  Id. at 731.  
The D.C. Circuit rejected that argument and held that the 
agency’s actions were not yet subject to review because the 
agency had not taken any final action.  Id. at 731-32.  The court 
reasoned that “the agency has not yet made any determination 
or issued any order imposing any obligation on [the plaintiff], 
denying any right of [the plaintiff], or fixing any legal 
relationship.”  Id. at 732.  According to the court, the plaintiff 
still had the opportunity to convince the agency that the term 
“consumer product” did not include its automatic sprinkler 
heads, which would strip the agency of jurisdiction.  Id. at 732-
33.  As the court saw it, allowing the plaintiff’s claim to move 
forward at that time would have produced piecemeal litigation 
over the agency’s jurisdiction and other points of appeal.  Id. 
at 733. 
 
That decision is distinguishable.  Whereas the agency in 
Reliable had not yet made a final decision about its regulatory 
jurisdiction, the Commission here has taken a definitive 
position that it has authority to review “well pads, exploratory 
wells, hydraulic fracturing and related activities” under the 
Compact.  (Joint App. at 37 n.14.)  That the Commission has 
thus asserted its jurisdiction is a finding of fact by the District 
Court based on the clear language of Collier’s 2009 and 2010 
executive letters, and the finding is well founded.  
Furthermore, unlike the agency in Reliable, which merely 
requested voluntary compliance from the plaintiff without 
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threatening sanctions, Tambini’s testimony indicates that the 
Commission has taken the position that anyone planning 
construction of facilities associated with fracking must submit 
an application to the Commission or face the threat of 
substantial fines.  And while it is generally preferable to 
resolve a case all at once, the possibility that the Commission 
may be upheld in asserting jurisdiction and that this case may 
have a second phase does not outweigh Wayne’s competing 
interest in a declaration of its rights.  On the issue before us, 
Wayne’s claim allows for a conclusive legal judgment. 
 
Third and finally, a ruling on Wayne’s request for 
declaratory relief would have particular utility.  A judgment 
“will affect the parties’ plans of actions by alleviating legal 
uncertainty.”  Surrick, 449 F.3d at 529.  In the context of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, utility exists when the judgment 
would “materially affect the parties and serve … [to] clarify[] 
legal relationships so that plaintiffs … [can] make responsible 
decisions about the future.”  Id. (last ellipses and last alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Here, a grant or denial of the relief Wayne requests would 
clarify the legal relationship between Wayne (and other 
similarly situated natural gas companies) and the Commission 
so that fracking firms can operate with a better understanding 
of their legal constraints. 
 
Based on those considerations of adversity, 
conclusiveness, and utility, Wayne’s claim is ripe for judicial 
review. 
 
2. Standing 
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In addition to having a ripe claim, a plaintiff must also 
have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
under Article III of the United States Constitution.  Lujan v. 
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  As with ripeness, 
the test for standing has three elements.  Id.  First, the plaintiff 
must have suffered an injury in fact.  Id.  That requires “an 
invasion of a legally protected interest” which is “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent,” rather than 
“conjectural or hypothetical.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  Second, there must be a causal link 
between the injury and the allegedly improper conduct.  Id.  
“[T]he injury has to be ‘fairly … trace[able] to the challenged 
action of the defendant, and not … th[e] result [of] the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.”  
Id. (all alterations but the first in original).  Third, it must be 
likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.  
Id. at 561.  “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the 
burden of establishing [those three] elements.”  Id. 
 
 Here, Wayne has met that burden.  It has shown 
concrete and particularized injury because the Commission’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over well pad construction, 
exploratory well drilling, and fracking activities has prevented 
Wayne from realizing the market value of natural resources on 
its property, has caused Wayne to face a threat of sanctions, 
and has confronted Wayne with an extensive and expensive 
application process.  The Commission’s assertion of 
jurisdiction over and imposition of a moratorium on Wayne’s 
activities is the cause of those injuries because it prevents 
Wayne from fracking on its property.  And a decision in 
Wayne’s favor would redress the alleged injury by removing, 
at least as to Wayne, the moratorium on fracking in the Basin.  
For those reasons, we are satisfied that Wayne has standing. 
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3. Final Agency Action and Exhaustion of 
Administrative Remedies 
 
There is a strong presumption that judicial review of an 
agency action is only available after that action becomes final, 
Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983), and the 
Commission thus contends that this suit should be dismissed 
because it has not made a final decision about Wayne’s 
proposed activities.10  Most of the decisions bearing on the 
reviewability of agency actions are, unsurprisingly, from cases 
in which the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) was the 
controlling law.  See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-
78 (1997) (stating two requirements for concluding that an 
agency action is final, including that “the action must mark the 
‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” 
which means “it must not be of a merely tentative or 
interlocutory nature[,]” and “the action must be one by which 
‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which 
‘legal consequences will flow …’” (citation omitted)).  By its 
terms, however, the Compact is not subject to the APA.  (See 
Joint App. at 400, § 15.1(m) (stating that the Commission is 
                                              
10  Sometimes the “final agency action” requirement has 
been couched in terms of jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Minard Run 
Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2011).  
But we have noted that that is “too loose a use of that term.”  
Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 125 n.11 (2012).  The 
federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, provides federal 
courts with jurisdiction to review agency actions.  Id.  The 
“final agency action” requirement, instead, goes to whether 
there is a cause of action under the statute that provides for 
judicial review of a given agency determination.  Id. 
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not a federal agency for purposes of the APA)).  How to 
approach the issue of final agency action without relying on 
legal precedents developed under the APA is an interesting 
question but, fortunately, one we do not need to address, 
because the question Wayne poses is not really one of 
administrative law at all. 
 
Wayne is not asking for a review of an agency’s action.  
Wayne’s complaint does not seek to invalidate Collier’s letters 
placing a moratorium on fracking activities in the Basin.  
Instead, Wayne seeks “a declaratory judgment that its proposed 
activities do not constitute a ‘project’ subject to [the 
Commission’s] project review under Section 3.8 of the 
Compact.”  (Joint App. at 40.)  Even though the APA, which 
requires final agency action to invoke judicial review, see 
5 U.S.C. § 704, does not apply, the Commission would have us 
invoke the final agency action requirement because § 3.8 says 
that “[a]ny determination of the [C]ommission [under § 3.8] 
shall be subject to judicial review in any court of competent 
jurisdiction.”  (Joint App. at 370.)  The Commission reads that 
to mean that until it has made a determination, there is no 
judicial review available.  Of course, that language can also be 
read as meaning simply that courts can review determinations 
about projects, not that they can review only such 
determinations.  Other kinds of disputes are possible, and this 
is one.  Our jurisdiction is an extension of the District Court’s 
and is derived from § 15.1(p) of the Compact, which states that 
“[t]he United States district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all cases or controversies arising under the 
Compact[.]”  (Joint App. at 401.)  Wayne’s claim presents a 
case or controversy arising under the Compact, for the reasons 
already stated.  As more fully discussed herein, we are dealing 
with what is, in essence, contract interpretation.  Thus, we 
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conclude that the “final agency action” requirement of 
administrative law is not applicable and does not determine our 
ability to review this case. 
 
The Commission also invokes the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies in its effort to block this 
suit.  While related to the finality requirement, exhaustion is 
conceptually distinct.  Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144 
(1993).  As just noted, however, we are dealing with 
interpretation of the Compact itself, not a question of 
administrative law, so exhaustion, like finality, is not an 
operative principle.11  For those reasons, we agree with the 
                                              
11  Even if we were to consider administrative law 
principles, we do not think an adequate process existed to 
which an exhaustion requirement might attach.  The 
Commission contends that Wayne failed to seek a 
jurisdictional determination before bringing this lawsuit.  
Tambini testified, however, that no one has ever sought a 
jurisdictional determination from the Commission, that there 
are no published or established procedures for obtaining a 
jurisdictional determination, and that the only way to obtain 
one is by submitting something – what that might be is wholly 
unclear – in writing to the Executive Director of the 
Commission.  We would be hard-pressed to demand that 
regulated parties exhaust administrative procedures that are 
either unknown or so vague as to be unknowable.  Just because 
the Commission now declares that it “is committed to making 
a jurisdictional determination within ninety days of [Wayne’s] 
submission of a request with supporting details of its planned 
activities and facilities” does not mean Wayne has suddenly 
failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.  
(Answering Br. at 31.)  There are no established remedies, and 
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District Court’s refusal to dismiss Wayne’s claim based on an 
alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  Seeing no 
impediment to our responsibility to exercise jurisdiction, we 
proceed to the merits. 
 
B. The Merits 
Wayne argues that the District Court erred by 
dismissing its complaint for failure to state a claim.12  We 
review that decision de novo under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  Marathon Petroleum Corp., 876 F.3d at 
488 n.9.  “When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we 
‘accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, 
under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff 
may be entitled to relief.’”  Blanyar v. Genova Prods. Inc., 861 
F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).  We may 
consider “only the complaint, exhibits attached to the 
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly 
authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based 
upon [those] documents.”  Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju 
                                              
we are not interrupting any “administrative process” by 
hearing Wayne’s claim now. 
 
12  Wayne also argues that the District Court erred by 
deciding sua sponte to reach the merits of its claim because the 
District Court did not provide Wayne notice or an opportunity 
to be heard before dismissing its complaint on those grounds.  
We do not need to decide that issue because, following full 
merits briefing on appeal and plenary review of the matter 
decided below, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment 
and remand for further proceedings on the merits. 
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Pharm. Co. Ltd., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)).   
 
The District Court concluded that it was apparent from 
the face of Wayne’s complaint that its proposed activities 
constituted a “project” subject to the Commission’s project 
review authority under § 3.8 of the Compact.  The Court 
determined that the text of the Compact, especially its 
definitions of “project,” “facility,” and “water resources,” can 
be read only one way and plainly encompass Wayne’s 
proposed activities.  Wayne argues that the District Court erred 
because the Compact plainly excludes its proposed fracking-
related activities from the scope of the Commission’s project 
review authority, or at the very least, because the Compact is 
ambiguous on that point.  The Commission counters that “the 
District Court correctly dismissed [Wayne’s complaint] 
because the well pad and high volume hydraulic fracturing as 
customarily performed in the oil and gas industry clearly 
comprise a project.”  (Answering Br. at 32.)  We conclude that 
the text of the Compact is ambiguous and, consequently, that a 
decision on the merits was premature. 
 
1. Principles of Interpretation for Interstate 
Compacts 
 
The United States Constitution requires that interstate 
compacts be approved by Congress.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, 
cl. 3.  Such approval transforms compacts into federal law.  
Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 620 
(2013).  Nonetheless, “[i]nterstate compacts are construed as 
contracts under the principles of contract law.”  Id. at 628.  As 
with any contract, the analysis begins with “the express terms 
of the Compact as the best indication of the intent of the 
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parties[.]”  Id.  But, if the text of the Compact is ambiguous, 
we must then “turn to other interpretive tools to shed light on 
the intent of the Compact’s drafters.”  Id. at 631.  One of those 
interpretative tools is the background notion “that States do not 
easily cede their sovereign powers, including their control over 
waters within their own territories[.]”  Id.  Other guideposts 
include the treatment of similar issues in other interstate water 
compacts, the parties’ course of performance under the 
Compact, and the negotiation and legislative history of the 
Compact.  Id.; Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 
n.5 (1991). 
 
2. Standard of Review for the District 
Court’s Merits Determination 
 
Since we construe the Compact using traditional 
contract principles, that must also inform the standard of 
review we apply to the District Court’s reading of the Compact.  
Typically, our review of a lower court’s understanding of 
congressional legislation is plenary because it is a matter of 
statutory interpretation.  Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 
F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017).  That includes both an analysis 
of the statute’s plain meaning and sometimes, to the extent the 
statute is ambiguous, a review of extrinsic evidence of 
Congressional intent.  United States v. Williams, 675 F.3d 275, 
277-78 (3d Cir. 2012).  But the Supreme Court has made clear 
that we are not conducting statutory interpretation when 
analyzing the terms of a compact – again, such “compacts are 
construed as contracts under the principles of contract law.”  
Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 628.  Contract principles suggest that our 
standard of review is different than that applicable to statutory 
interpretation. 
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Under our case law, contract interpretation is a question 
of fact reviewed for clear error and contract construction is a 
question of law reviewed de novo.13  Tracinda Corp. v. 
DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 229 (3d Cir. 2007).  We 
have explained that, for purposes of contract interpretation, 
“[i]f the contract as a whole is susceptible to more than one 
                                              
13  “The distinction between interpretation and 
construction is not always easy.”  John F. Harkins Co., Inc. v. 
Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cir. 1986).  We have 
previously turned to Professor Corbin for guidance on how to 
describe the distinction: 
 
By “interpretation of language” we determine 
what ideas that language induces in other 
persons.  By “construction of the contract,” as 
that term will be used here, we determine its legal 
operation—its effect upon the action of courts 
and administrative officials.  If we make this 
distinction, then the construction of a contract 
starts with the interpretation of its language but 
does not end with it; while the process of 
interpretation stops wholly short of a 
determination of the legal relations of the parties.  
When a court gives a construction to the contract 
as that is affected by events subsequent to its 
making and not foreseen by the parties, it is 
departing very far from mere interpretation of 
their symbols of expression, although even then 
it may claim somewhat erroneously to be giving 
effect to the “intention” of the parties. 
 
Id. (quoting 3 Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 534 (1960)). 
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reading, the fact finder resolves the matter, but if it is 
unambiguous and can be interpreted only one way, the court 
interprets the contract as a matter of law.”  Allied Erecting & 
Dismantling, Co., Inc. v. USX Corp., 249 F.3d 191, 201 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
 Thus, our analysis proceeds in the alternative.  To begin, 
we review de novo the text of the Compact to determine 
whether we agree with the District Court that it is 
unambiguous.  Next, if we agree that the text is unambiguous, 
then we also review de novo whether Wayne’s proposed 
activities on the face of the complaint fall within the scope of 
the Compact’s text.  If, on the other hand, our review of the 
text of the Compact leads us to conclude that it is ambiguous, 
then we review for clear error the District Court’s findings 
regarding the intent of the parties in crafting that text. 
 
We turn to that analysis using the contract principles 
and interpretive tools endorsed by the Supreme Court. 
 
3. Whether the Compact is Ambiguous 
 
In interpreting the terms of the Compact, the first step is 
to clearly define the issue in dispute.  Wayne asked in its 
complaint for a declaration “that the Commission does not 
have jurisdiction over, or the authority to review and approve, 
or to require [Wayne] to seek prior approval from the 
Commission for, or to otherwise preclude the development of, 
[Wayne’s] proposed well pad, appurtenant facilities or the 
related activities to be carried out on the [p]roperty.”14  (Joint 
                                              
14  Wayne’s complaint defines “Well Pads” as “natural 
gas well pads, all appurtenant facilities, and related activities 
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App. at 79.)  In other words, Wayne framed the issue as 
whether the Compact’s definition of “project” encompasses its 
proposed well pad and related activities.  We interpret the 
Compact with respect to only the facts stated on the face of the 
complaint. 
 
The Compact itself tells us that its provisions are to be 
“reasonably and liberally construed.”  (Joint App. at 396, 
§ 14.21.)  In keeping with that, we’ve said “[t]he signatory 
governments [of the Compact] granted broad powers to the 
Commission, thereby offering the agency ‘a realistic 
opportunity to effectuate a comprehensive plan that concerned 
itself with water quality as well as water supply, hydroelectric 
power, recreational areas, wildlife conservation, and flood 
protection.”  Del. River Basin Comm’n v. Bucks Cty. Water & 
Sewer Auth., 641 F.2d 1087, 1089 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation 
omitted).  But breadth does not equal clarity, at least not with 
respect to the issue here. 
 
Interpreting the Compact according to its language and 
in light of Wayne’s proposed activities, the term “project” is 
ambiguous for three reasons.  First, the District Court’s 
interpretation of the term “project” may read the word “for” 
out of the Compact and may give the Commission more power 
than the drafters intended.  Second, although combining the 
definitions of “project” and “water resources” as the District 
Court did may not be unreasonable, it does not resolve the 
ambiguity.  Finally, interpreting “project” in light of the 
Compact as a whole, the broad reading adopted by the District 
                                              
carried out in connection with gas wells targeting shale 
formations in the Basin[.]”  (Joint App. at 68.) 
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Court may be at odds with the use of that term in other 
provisions.  We discuss each of those reasons in turn. 
 
i. The Compact’s Definition of 
“Project” 
 
Reasonable arguments can be and have been made both 
in support of and against the District Court’s conclusion that 
the word “project” includes Wayne’s proposed activities.15  
That suggests that the word “project,” as used in the Compact, 
is ambiguous.  The dispute over the Compact’s definition of 
“project” centers primarily on the word “for.”  As a reminder, 
the Compact defines a “project” as: 
 
any work, service or activity which is separately 
planned, financed, or identified by the 
[C]ommission, or any separate facility 
undertaken or to be undertaken within a specified 
area, for the conservation, utilization, control, 
development or management of water resources 
which can be established and utilized 
independently or as an addition to an existing 
facility, and can be considered as a separate 
entity for purposes of evaluation[.] 
 
                                              
15  Throughout the remainder of this opinion, when we 
use the word “reasonable” to describe a given interpretation, 
we mean “potentially reasonable” or “conceivably correct.”  
As discussed further herein, additional information regarding 
the intent of the Compact’s drafters may alter one’s view of 
whether a particular interpretation is truly one that the Compact 
can bear. 
37 
 
(Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(g) (emphasis added).)  The word “for” 
is commonly “used as a function word to indicate purpose” or 
“an intended goal.”  For, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2002). 
 
Wayne argues that its fracking-related activities are not 
“for the … utilization … of water resources” and, if considered 
to be “facilities,” as defined in the Compact, are not facilities 
“undertaken … for the … utilization … of water resources[.]”  
(Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(g) (emphasis added).)  Wayne asserts 
that it does not propose to frack for the purpose or intended 
goal of using water, but rather for the purpose and goal of 
capturing natural gas.  Water just happens to be used in that 
process.  From Wayne’s perspective, the Commission’s and 
the District Court’s interpretation of “project” reads the word 
“for” out of the definition and replaces it with the phrase “that 
involves.”  Essentially, Wayne frames the Commission’s and 
the District Court’s interpretation as extending “project” to 
cover “any … activity … identified by the [C]ommission, or 
any separate facility undertaken …, [that involves] water 
resources[.]”  (Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(g).)16 
                                              
16  The focus of our analysis is on the word “utilization” 
because that appears to be most directly connected to Wayne’s 
activities, but the Commission points out that “management” 
of water resources could also cover fracking because fracking 
involves management of wastewater and storage of needed 
water and chemicals before their use.  While that is likely true, 
it runs into the same issues Wayne identifies with respect to 
“utilization” of water resources, namely that we cannot ignore 
that fracking is not for the purpose of managing water 
resources.  Thus, that distinction does not alter our analysis or 
conclusion. 
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That has some persuasive force.  No matter how 
“reasonably and liberally” we construe The Compact’s terms 
(Joint App. at 396, § 14.21), we cannot ignore that the word 
“for” must have some purposive meaning and limiting 
function.  Doing so would sweep nearly any activity that 
happens to use Basin water into the Compact’s definition of 
“project,” which could potentially include the construction of 
a new skyscraper in New York City or a small housing 
development in rural Pennsylvania.  Even ignoring the word 
“for,” however, there appears to be a boundary on the 
Commission’s authority to review development in the Basin, 
since § 3.8 only allows the Commission to review projects 
“having a substantial effect on the water resources of the 
[B]asin[.]”  (Joint App. at 370, § 3.8.)  Furthermore, we 
question the assertion that fracking clearly constitutes a project 
subject to the Commission’s authority, because it is not at all 
clear on this record how the five million gallons of water used 
in fracking a well compares with the quantity of water used to 
perform other activities that few if any people would say the 
Commission was intended to control.17   
 
                                              
 
17  We emphasize that we are presented with a question 
about the Commission’s authority to review and approve 
“projects” under § 3.8 of the Compact.  We are not considering 
the Commission’s authority under any other provisions, such 
as §§ 5.1-5.5, which address pollution control.  We take no 
position on whether Article 5 provides the Commission an 
alternative jurisdictional basis to require advance approval of 
fracking activity. 
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The Commission counters that, even if it were true that 
an activity or facility had to be undertaken for the purpose of 
using water resources for the Commission to have power to 
review it as a “project,” fracking activities satisfy that 
requirement.  First, says the Commission, fracking 
purposefully uses water because it consumes it, leaving much 
of the fracking mixture buried and useless (or worse) in the 
ground.  Deliberate, repetitive use of water is an essential part 
of fracking, and the Commission contends that is enough to 
conclude that the purpose of fracking is to utilize water 
resources.  Second, the Commission says that, even if one well 
only uses a relatively minor amount of water, the collective 
quantity of water used by all the fracking wells that could be 
drilled in the Basin is so large that it cannot be allowed to 
escape the Commission’s reach.  Both of those are serious 
arguments and deserve careful attention, but they do not 
foreclose the possibility that Wayne’s interpretation of the term 
“project” is correct. 
 
The Commission also argues that adopting Wayne’s 
understanding of the term “project” is too narrow and would 
improperly constrain the Commission’s authority over other 
activities in the Basin.  Specifically, the Commission contends 
that Wayne’s interpretation of “project” would prevent the 
Commission from being able to regulate industrial wastewater 
discharges or hydroelectric power generation facilities because 
they have purposes other than the mere utilization or 
management of water.  That response, however, only 
highlights the tension between Wayne’s reading and the 
Commission’s reading.  It does not prove that the 
Commission’s view of its own powers reflects a better 
understanding of what the Compact’s drafters meant, 
particularly since that broader interpretation has its own flaws.  
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As already noted, it has the troubling potential to sweep into 
the definition of “project” any activity or facility that uses 
water.  Moreover, the Commission seems to be overstating 
Wayne’s argument.  Wayne has not said that hydroelectric 
power plants are not water resource development projects, and 
it would be foolish to make that argument since the Compact’s 
preamble expressly contemplates a comprehensive plan that 
provides for the “development of hydroelectric power 
potentialities[.]”  (Joint App. at 360.)  Indeed, wholly apart 
from Article 3 and the Commission’s project review authority, 
Article 9 explicitly grants the Commission authority with 
respect to hydroelectric power facilities.  As for industrial 
wastewater discharges, they are regulated separately as 
pollutants under Article 5.  Thus, the Commission’s arguments 
do not resolve and perhaps only emphasize the ambiguity of 
the term “project,” as used in § 3.8 of the Compact and as the 
Commission has applied it to fracking. 
 
ii. “Project” in Conjunction with 
“Water Resources” 
  
 We next consider the District Court’s use of the defined 
term “water resources” to interpret the term “project.”  The 
Compact defines “water resources” as “water and related 
natural resources in, on, under, or above the ground, including 
related uses of land, which are subject to beneficial use, 
ownership or control.”18  (Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(i).)  The 
                                              
18  The Compact does not define what it means for “water 
and related natural resources” to be “subject to beneficial use, 
ownership or control.”  (Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(g).)  It does 
not explain whom or what is using, owning, or controlling the 
water resources.  And although that wording suggests that 
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District Court said that reading “project” in conjunction with 
“water resources” demonstrates that fracking is “a facility 
undertaken for the utilization of ‘water resources’” because 
“the well pad and related [fracking activities] admittedly 
involve … water ‘in, on, under or above the ground’ and 
‘related uses of land.’”19  (Joint App. at 46 (citation omitted).)  
The Commission argues in favor of that line of reasoning, but 
we are not persuaded that combining “project” and “water 
resources” resolves the ambiguity in the definition of “project.” 
 
 Although the District Court’s approach cannot be 
dismissed out of hand, the resulting interpretation is not the 
only reasonable one and is in fact subject to non-frivolous 
criticism.  Wayne contends that the District Court’s 
interpretation equates to saying a project is any activity for the 
                                              
water and related natural resources may exist in the Basin that 
are not subject to beneficial use, ownership, or control, it is 
unclear what may constitute such water resources. 
 
19  When the definitions of “project” and “water 
resources” are combined, the following definition is produced: 
 
[A project is] any … activity which is separately 
… identified by the [C]ommission, or any 
separate facility undertaken …, for the … 
utilization … or management of water and 
related natural resources in, on, under, or above 
the ground, including related uses of land, which 
are subject to beneficial use, ownership or 
control. 
 
(Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(g), (i).) 
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use of “‘land and related natural resources … including related 
uses of water’ in the Basin,” rather than the other way around.  
(Opening Br. at 34.)  Read one way, the District Court’s 
approach has merit.  Activities and facilities undertaken with 
some goal that uses the land in a way related to the 
management or utilization of water could indeed be projects.  
However, read as Wayne suggests, the District Court’s 
approach arguably inverts the most natural reading of the text.  
Even if Wayne’s interpretation is not ultimately the correct 
one, at the very least, it casts doubt upon the District Court’s 
interpretation. 
 
iii. “Project” in Light of Other 
Compact Provisions 
 
Looking at the Compact as a whole, the use of the word 
“project” throughout the instrument exacerbates the ambiguity.  
Provisions in a compact should be interpreted in light of the 
document as a whole.  Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 
1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 202(2) (1981) (“A writing is interpreted as a 
whole[.]”).  Wayne argues that the term “project,” read in the 
context of the entire Compact, demonstrates that it covers only 
water resource projects, or projects undertaken with the 
specific purpose of conserving, using, or managing water 
resources.  The Commission, the Delaware Riverkeeper 
Network, and Ms. van Rossum counter that the Compact, read 
as a whole, shows that any activity or facility with major effects 
on water quantity or quality can be a “project.”  Once again, 
neither party plainly has the better of the argument concerning 
the meaning of “project” in § 3.8 and we are left to conclude 
that the term is ambiguous. 
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There are other provisions in the Compact that suggest 
that the drafters did not intend to define “project” as broadly as 
the Commission contends.  For example, rules of contract 
interpretation advise us to interpret the meaning of a word by 
considering the words associated with it.  See Post v. St. Paul 
Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 520 (3d Cir. 2012) (observing 
that “[t]he ancient maxim ‘noscitur a sociis’ summarizes the 
rule that the meaning of words may be indicated or controlled 
by those words with which they are associated.  Words are 
known by the company they keep” (citation omitted)).  Broadly 
defining “project” to include Wayne’s proposed fracking-
related activities would sweep in undertakings that could 
appear out of place among the (admittedly non-exhaustive) list 
of projects and facilities expressly set forth in the description 
of the Commission’s general powers.  That list includes: 
 
water and waste treatment plants, stream and 
lake recreational facilities, trunk mains for water 
distribution, local flood protection works, small 
watershed management programs, and ground 
water recharging operations[.] 
 
(Joint App. at 369, § 3.6(b).)  Those are arguably different in 
purpose and in kind than fracking operations.20 
                                              
20  Other provisions may also highlight potential issues 
or inconsistencies associated with broadly defining the term 
“project.”  (See, e.g., Joint App. at 353-409, §§ 1.5 (preserving 
the role of existing federal and state agencies), 3.3 (defining 
the Commission’s power to allocate water within the Basin), 
3.5 (limiting the powers of the Commission), 11.1-.2 
(discussing the Commission’s jurisdiction relative to other 
federal, state, and local agencies), 11.4 (requiring the 
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Nevertheless, there are provisions in the Compact that 
indicate a broad definition of “project” may well have been 
intended.  For example, § 1.3(e) states that the purposes of the 
Compact include, among other things: 
 
encourag[ing] and provid[ing] for the planning, 
conservation, utilization, development, 
management and control of the water resources 
of the [B]asin … and … apply[ing] the principle 
of equal and uniform treatment to all water users 
who are similarly situated and to all users of 
related facilities[.] 
 
(Joint App. at 364, § 1.3(e).)  The Commission makes a 
forceful argument that exempting fracking activities from the 
scope of the term “project” would give natural gas producers 
preference over other industrial water users that are regulated.  
Furthermore, § 3.6 broadly states that the Commission has any 
powers “necessary or convenient to carry out its express 
                                              
Commission to establish project cost and evaluation 
standards), 12.2 (contemplating capital funding and expenses 
associated with project and facility construction), 12.8 
(discussing tax exemptions for bonds issued by the 
Commission), 13.1-.2 (calling for the development of a 
comprehensive plan and water resources program), 15.1 
(reserving rights and powers belonging to the United States 
Congress).) 
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powers or which may be reasonably implied therefrom.”21  
(Joint App. at 370, § 3.6(h).) 
 
 In sum, interpreting the term “project” in light of the 
provisions in the whole Compact does not remove the 
ambiguity. 
 
4. The Need for Further Fact-Finding 
 
The parties have identified conflicting reasonable 
interpretations of the term “project,” which counsels us to 
conclude that the District Court erred when it decided that the 
Commission’s project review authority under the terms of the 
Compact unambiguously includes Wayne’s proposed 
activities.  To be clear, at this stage, we are not adopting or 
endorsing either Wayne’s interpretation or the Commission’s, 
or anyone else’s.  We are simply noting that the parties have 
posited potentially reasonable interpretations that bear their 
own strengths and weaknesses.  On one side, Wayne’s 
interpretation fails to explain how, at the very least, its 
proposed water storage tanks are not subject to the 
Commission’s project review authority given that it agrees that 
“there can be components of an undertaking that can be a 
project.”  (Oral Arg. Tr., Nov. 7, 2017, at 8:23-24.)  Wayne is 
                                              
21 The Delaware Riverkeeper Network and Ms. van 
Rossum also contend that the Compact contemplated the 
Commission’s jurisdiction to include both “water and related 
resources” because that term is used in numerous places 
throughout the Compact.  (Intervenor Br. at 12.)  But despite 
its efforts to tie “related resources” to fracking, those parties 
have not shown how “related resources” extends beyond 
“water resources” as the Compact broadly defines that term. 
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bound by the allegations in its complaint, and those allegations 
include that water “will be managed and delivered to the [w]ell 
[p]ad” site and presumably stored until used, but, oddly, that 
none of “the appurtenant facilities to be constructed” will be 
for the “control … or management of water resources.”  (Joint 
App. at 70-71.)22  On the other side, the interpretation advanced 
by the Commission, the Delaware Riverkeeper Network, and 
Ms. van Rossum can be seen as unduly broad to the extent it 
could permit the Commission to exercise authority to review 
and control nearly all productive land use within the Basin.  
Furthermore, their interpretation does not effectively address 
                                              
22  We note as well that in its briefing before us, Wayne 
characterizes the issue on appeal as “whether land cleared to 
accommodate a natural gas well, known as a ‘well pad,’ and 
the natural gas well drilled on the pad, separately, or considered 
together, constitute a ‘project’ subject to review by the 
Commission under Section 3.8 of the Compact.”  (Opening Br. 
at 14.)  An argument can be made that that restatement of the 
issue is narrower than the language in the complaint and that 
Wayne is essentially trying to characterize what it seeks as a 
less-aggressive limiting of the scope of the Commission’s 
“project” review authority.  Nothing in our opinion should be 
interpreted on remand as limiting the broad language of the 
complaint – which defines the dispute before the Court – or the 
District Court’s discretion to manage the process of presenting 
and deciding any narrower questions which may prove 
particularly important to bringing this case to a final resolution 
(and perhaps to crafting a final remedy).  Of course, that 
process of clarifying the issues to be litigated may include 
appropriate alterations to Wayne’s complaint, which may be 
amended in the Court’s discretion.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a)(2). 
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the legislative amici’s argument that the Compact contains no 
clear indication that Pennsylvania intended to cede its 
sovereign power so extensively to the Commission.   
 
Because we interpret the Compact as a contract and we 
have determined that it is ambiguous as to whether Wayne’s 
proposed activities are subject to the Commission’s project 
review authority under § 3.8, we are left to use “other 
interpretive tools to shed light on the intent of the Compact’s 
drafters.”  Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 631.  The problem, however, is 
that those interpretive tools require factual determinations to 
be made about the Compact drafters’ intent.  See Sumitomo 
Machinery Corp. of Am., Inc. v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 81 F.3d 328, 
335 (3d Cir. 1996) (remanding a contractual dispute to the 
district court for further fact-finding because, “[w]hen a 
contract is ambiguous, the ‘fact-finder must attempt to discover 
what the contracting parties … intended [the disputed 
provisions] to mean’” (alterations in original) (citation 
omitted)).  The District Court must have the opportunity to 
evaluate in the first instance how other interstate compacts, the 
parties’ course of performance, and the negotiation and 
legislative history of the Compact, among other evidence, bear 
on the question of intent.  The interpretation that should prevail 
is the one that aligns best with the drafters’ intent.23 
                                              
23  The Commission contends that its interpretation of 
the term “project” is entitled to deference under Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984).  But, as we noted earlier, the Supreme Court 
has clearly instructed that “compacts are construed as contracts 
under the principles of contract law.”  Tarrant, 569 U.S. at 628.  
Because the Compact is not to be interpreted as a statute, 
Chevron deference has no place here. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of 
dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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Wayne Land and Mineral Group, LLC v. Delaware River Basin 
Commission, et al. No. 17-1800 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring 
 
I agree with my colleagues that the term “project,” as 
used in Section 3.8 of the Delaware River Basin Compact, is 
ambiguous, and that the matter should be remanded to the 
District Court for fact-finding respecting the Compact drafters’ 
intent.  But I have a considerable concern—involving my 
colleagues’ characterization and evaluation of some of the 
parties’ arguments on the central issue in this case—that 
precludes me from joining in full their well crafted Opinion. 
 
My colleagues have provided an assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of some of the parties’ arguments.  
In light of our decision to remand, however, I see no need to 
characterize or evaluate the merits of the parties’ contentions.  
I fully agree that, “[t]o be clear, at this stage, we are not 
adopting or endorsing either Wayne’s interpretation or the 
Commission’s, or anyone else’s.”  Maj. Op. at 46.  The parties 
have raised key arguments the District Court must evaluate in 
the first instance on remand, without consideration of our 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the case. 
 
Because I would not discuss the merits of the parties’ 
arguments, I concur. 
